























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































District 1，882 1，906 1，914
Adana 9，651 14，472 15，795
Cebel－i　Bereket 6，571 12，537 12，308
Mersin 1，604 4，173 3，719
Kozan 26，786 15，494 18，317
Total 44，612 46，676 50，139
Source：Karpat，　Kemal（1985）Ottoman　Population　1830－1914，　Demographic　and　Soctα1　Char－
　　　　　acteristics，　Madison：University　of　Wisconsin　Press．
　　　The　rβason　for　slow　influx　of　Armenians　into　the　Adana　province
was　due　to　the　restrictive　policy　of　the　Ottoman　government．　Cilicia
was　a　strategically　important　region　because　of　its　proximity　to　the　sea，
its　position　on　the　Bagdad　railway　and　its　strategic　importance　for　vari－
ous　foreign　powers．　Against　this　background，　the　Porte　began　to　show
concern　about　the　increase　in　number　of　Armenians　and　a　kept　wat¢h－
ful　eye　on　the　process．　On　27　January　1882，　the　minister　of　gendarmerie
presented　a　report　on　Armenians　in　the　Adana　province．　Which　sug・
gested　a　mounting　problem　from　on　the　sudden　increase　in　number　of
seasonal　workers：“lt　has　become　common　for　about　three　thousand　of
Armenian　workers　to　come　from　Adana　to　Harput，　Diyarbakir，　Van　and
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Bitlis　every　year　at　the　beginning　of　March　and　return　in　autumn．　This
year，　however，　the　number　reached　approximately　twenty　thousand．”
（BOA．　Y．　MTV．56／60）Although　he　admitted　that　the　increase　was　due
to　the　successful　growth　of　the　agrarian　sector，　the　minister　believed　in
that　Armenian　political　conspiracies　were　being　carried　on　in　Adana
and　other　regions　belonging　to　the　jurisdiction　of　the　Catholicos　of　Sis
and　that　arms　and　ammunitions　were　being　smuggled　into　the　Arme－
nian　villages　from　Europe　by　way　of　Cyprus，　Mersin　and　Yumurtallk．
So，　he　claimed，“lt　is　against　the　national　interest　if　we　fail　to　pay　atten－
tion　to　the　arrival　of　a　large　number　of　Armenian　workers　in　such　a
center　of　Armenian　terrorism　like　Adana　at　the　very　time　when　the
Armenians　do　not　cease　to　carry　out　their　subversive　political　activi－
ties．”（BOA．　Y．　MTV．56／60）
　　　In　the　same　report，　the　minister　showed　particular　concern　about
Armenian　land　ownership　in　the　Cebel－i　Bereket．　According　to　his　opin－
ion，　each　of　four　large　villages　with　a　pure　Armenian　population
（Evzerli，（⊇ayli，　Ocakll　and　D6rtyo｝）had　its　own“terrorist　organiza－
tion”and　became　the　incubus　for　their　political　intrigue．　Therefore，　he
claimed，“The　inhabitants　of　D6rtyol　are　hindering　Muslim　settlement
in　order　to　freely　carry　out　political　subversion　and　have　occupied　thou－
sands　of　d6nUms　of　lands　between　the　Yumurtahk　port　and　Payas　ei－
ther　on　the　pretext　that　they　had　the　title　deed　or　that　they　received　the
right　of　possession　in　exchange　for　an　unpaid　loan．”（BOA．　Y．　MTV．
56／60）
　　　With　this　understanding，　the　minister　emphasized　the　necessity　to
settle　the　Muslim　refugees　into　heavily　populates　Armenian　regions　in
order　to　counterbalance　the　increase　in　Armenians．　More　concretely，　he
proposed　to　settle　them　on　vacant　land　or　national　property　in　districts
and　counties　like　Sis，　Payas，　Cokmerzeman，　Yumurtalik，　Zeytun，（Payli，
Ocak11，　and　Mara＄．　In　order　to　justify　this　proposal，　the　minister
stressed　the　following　benefits：“lf　the　Muslims　succeed　in　consolidating
themselves　in　the　regions　of　Armenian　majority，　subversive　activities
wili　be　prevented．　So，　if　we　promote　the　settlelnent　of　the　refugees，　we
will　be　able　to　avoid　various　difficulties　and　it　will　surely　contribute　to
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the　peace　and　prosperity　of　the　state．”（BOA．　Y．　MTV．56／60）
　　　The　proposal　subsequently　approved　by　the　cabinet　and　the　Inte－
rior　minister　ordered　the　governor　of　Adana　to　prepare　for　the　forced
relocation　of　the　Muslim　refugees　on　to　vacant　land　and　national　prop－
erty　in　regions　heavily　populated　with　Armenians．　Subsequently　an
investigation　was　carried　out　to　assess　the　capacity　to　accommodate　the
refugees　and　it　turned　out　that，　the　Kozan　prefecture　didn’t　have
enough　room　to　accommodate　a　large　number　of　refugees，　but　the
Cebel－i　Bereket　prefecture　could　accept　twenty　or　thirty　thousand
households　to　move　into　this　area．（DH．　MKT．2006／33）In　this　way，　the
Cebel－i　Bereket　arose　as　a　focal　point　for　the　massive　colonization　of
Muslim　immigrants．
Socio－Religious　Differentiation　and　the　Rising　Tension　in　Communal
Relationships
　　　The　proposal　of　the　gendarmerie　minister　in　1882　helps　us　to　under－
stand　the　following　contradiction　in　the　Ottoman　colonization　of　the
Cukurova　plain．　The　Ottoman　government　had　been　especially　eager　to
settle　the　Russian　and　the　Balkan　refugees　in　this　area、　It　had　been
carrying　out　an　active　policy　of　cQlonizatiQn　in　the　wasteland　of
Cukurova　as　early　as　the　1860s　and　invited　a　large　number　of　ilnmi－
grants．　At　the　same　time，　they　showed　little　interest　in　the　efficient
exploitation　of　land．　Although　the　government　gave　the　settiers　land
plots　and　temporary　tax　exemption，　it　paid　little　attention　to　the　proIno－
tion　of　the　effective　land　exploitation　by　them．（Klray，1998：13）The
authorities　gave　little　help　in　accommodating　the　settlers　to　the　special
conditions　of　the　Cukurova．　As　most　of　the　settlers　had　come　from　the
northern　territories，　they　had　serious　difficulties　in　adopting　them－
selves　to　semi－tropical　type　of　agriculture　of　this　region．　As　a　result，　the
settlers　couid　not　even　establish　subsistence　farming　and　many　of　them
starved　to　death．　It　was　natural　that　a　large　number　of　new　comers
were　forced　to　rely　on　short　term　credits　and　soon　became　burdened
with　crippling　debts．　However　dire　their　s三tuation　was，　the　government
seldom　took　measures　to　alleviate　the　multiple　debts　of　the　peasants
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and　acquiesced　to　the　proliferation　of　an　unproductive　system　of　share
cropping．（Aytekin，2008：308）
　　　The　apparent　contradiction　becomes　understandable　when　we　take
into　account　the　fact　that　colonization　was　first　of　all　considered　as　a
counteraction　to　Armenian　revolutionary　activities　and　the　authorities
expected　to　contain　them　by　a　policy　of　the　separatism　and　the　forced
migration　of　Muslims　to　places　where　Armenians　constituted　a　major－
ity．　This　policy　also　coincides　with　the　fact　that　the　Ottoman　govern－
ment　didn’t　care　about　the　ethnic　origins　of　the　refugees　and　that　the
only　condition　it　required　was　whether　they　were　Muslims　or　not，
（Bayraktar，2007：413）
　　　In　due　course，　the　policy　intensified　the　dualism　of　the　local　econ－
omy　in　Cukurova，　While　the　Armenian　farmers　succeeded　in　establish－
ing　their　prosperous　cultivation　of　commercial　crops　and　were　eager　to
enlarge　their　enterprises　by　employing　seasonal　workers，　the　Muslim
refugees　continued　to　engage　in　subsistence　farming　and　often　lived
from　hand　to　mouth．　The　increase　in　their　number　didn’t　bring　about
the　overall　development　of　the　productivity　in　regional　agriculture．　On
the　contrary，　the　increase　of　Muslim　settlers　further　precipitated　the
ethnic　contortion．
　　　　Ajournalist　of　the　pro－CUP　newspaper‘Tanin，’Ahmed＄erif，　no－
ticed　the　stark　contrast　between　the　prosperity　of　Armenians　villages
and　the　lamentable　situation　of　Muslims　when　he　visited　the　Cebel－i
Bereket　in　1910．　He　met　Muslim　colonists　who　had　been　left　destitute　in
almost　all　of　prefectures．　For　example，　he　came　across　a　desperate　vil－
lage　on　his　way　to　Erzin　from　Orfiyye，　The　village　had　forty　or　fifty
huts，　all　covered　with　grass　and　were　very　run　down．　Only　a　small　part
of　the　fields　around　the　village　was　cultivated．　Everybody　looked
white－livered　and　unhealthy．　More　conspicuous　was　a　large　and　new
grave　yard　spreading　below　the　village．　There　were　as　many　as　two
hundred　tombs，　which　all　looked　new．　He　asked　one　of　the　villagers
about　the　reason　for　the　unusual　number　of　new　tombs．　The　villager
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　’
replied；“We　fled　from　the　coolest　part　of　Rumeli．　Although　they　gave
us　a　field　in　the　site　of　village，　we　were　forced　to　settle　down　in　this
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swampy　and　marshy　place．　Four　or　five　years　have　passed　since　we
came　here．　Less　than　one　tenth　of　the　first　settlers　are　still　living．
Every　day，　a　mother，　or　a　father，　or　a　brother，　or　a　child，　or　even　a　couple
passes　away．　Hence，　as　you　see，　we　are　sending　orle　of　them　into　the
earth　today．”（Serif，1999：136）
　　　In　contrast　to　the　destitution　of　the　Muslim　settlements，　the　Arme－
nian　villages　in　the　region　were　generally　better　off　and　proud　of　their
prosperous　appearance．　The　disparity　could　be　observed　not　only　in　the
fertile　plains　of　their　highly　developed　commercial　agriculture　but　also
in　the　mountainside．　For　example，　the　BahGe　district　was　in　a　rocky
barren　region　with　a　clear　Muslim　majority．　There　was　no　cultivation
of　commodity　crops，　except　for　sesame，　and　the　local　people　were　pri－
marily　engaged　in　subsistence　farming．　Even　so，　there　was　sharp　con－
trast　between　the　Muslim　and　Armenian　villages．　Ahmed＄erif
describes　the　prosperity　of　Hasanbeyli，　an　Armenian　village　amidst　a
poverty－stricken　mountainous　region：“Here　and　there，　either　in　a　de－
pressed　ground　or　a　valley，　we　saw　villages　of　fifteen　or　twenty　houses．
They　looked　very　miserable　and　poor．　We　couldn’t　see　them　from　a
distance，　as　the　houses　were　only　two　meters　high　and　hidden　in　the
earth＿But　Hasanbeyli，　all　Armenian　village，　is　a　very　different　from
this　one．　Although　it　is　on　the　same　road，　this　village　is　fairly　big　and
built　on　flat　land．　Well　cultivated　fields　and　meadows　around　it　also
look　amiable．”（＄erif，1999：159）
　　　Understanding　these　economic　gaps　exacerbated　communal　ten－
sions　between　Armenian　and　Muslim　villagers．　The　Muslims　who　were
forced　to　live　in　the　serious　condition　constantly　threatened　with　star－
vation　envied　and　even　felt　hostihty　to　the　more　affluent　life－style　of
their　Armenian　neighbors．　On　the　other　hand，　Armenians　suspiciously
viewed　the　poor　Muslim　transplants　wholn　they　believed　to　be　a　source
of　local　unrest．　They　were　also　discontented　with　an　immigration　po1－
icy　that　undercut　their　vigorous　entrepreneurship．
　　　The　petition　presented　by　the　Armenian　Bishop　of　Adana，
Mouchegh　Seropian，　to　the　governor，　Cevad　Bey　on　23　January　1909
quite　vividly　shows　the　Armenian　discontent　to　this　immigration　poli一
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cy．　It　elucidated　the　case　of　Neccarll　and　claims　it　as　the　typical　oppres－
sion　that　the　Armenians　were　facing　at．　According　to　his　explanation，
the　problem　arose　in　the　following　way．　When　a　group　of　refugees　ar－
rived　from　the　Balkans　in　1899／1900，　the　Armenian　village，　Neccarl1，　was
selected　as　one　of　the　candidates　to　accommodate　them．　But　the　inves－
tigation　carried　out　by　the　district　head　revealed　that　the　Armenians
had　the　title　deeds　over　the　lands　around　the　village　and　that　there　was
no　empty　land　to　settle　the　refugees　in　the　neighborhood　of　Neccar11．
Nevertheless，　the　members　of　the　refugee　committee　insisted　on　the
initial　decision　and　forced　the　villagers　to　accept　refugees．　The　refugees
subsequently　set　up　their　new　village，　Narh，　in　the　vicinity　of　Neccarll．
In　order　to　give　them　arable　lands，　the　provincial　authorities　confis－
cated　700　d6nUms　of　lands　from　the　Armenian　villagers　by　rescinding
their　ownership．　The　government　also　gave　an　additional　1480　d6nUms
to　the　refugees　but　the　plot　was　a　rocky　waste　land　and　completely
unsuitable　to　cultivation．　Therefore，　the　refugees　began　to　occupy　the
remaining　Armenian　properties．　In　the　view　of　this　apparent　transgres－
sion，　the　Armenians　protested　and　filed　law　suits　against　their　illegal
occupation．　But　these　actions　were　blocked　by　local　authorities　and
those　who　protested　openly　were　arrested．　The　attitude　of　the　authori－
ties　encouraged　the　refugees　to　seize　more　lands．　As　a　result，　a　total　of
2，100　d6nUms　of　land　had　been　seized　by　1905．　The　plight　of　the　Arme－
nians　was　more　serious　as　they　were　compelled　to　pay　taxes　on　their
usurped　lands．　Bishop　Moushegh　protested　the　provincial　authority
and　a　special　commission　was　established．　The　commission　ascertained
the　violation　and　ordered　the　return　of　the　property　to　the　Armenian
owners．　But　the　decision　was　sabotaged　by　the　lieutenant　governor　and
the　problem　remained　unsolved　until　1909．　According　to　the　Bishop，　the
case　of　Neccarll　was　by　no　means　an　isolated　one．　There　were　many
similar　cases　in　the　prefecture．　In　conclusion，　Mouchegh　asserted　that
“one　of　the　most　serious　problems”of　the　Armenians　in　the　Cebel－i
Bereket　was“the　terrible　violation　of　property　rights．”（BOA，　DH．　MKT．
1303／39）
　　　The　Armenian　discorltent　intensified　because　of　the　under・
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development　policy　of　the　government．　Along　with　the　colonization　of
the　Muslim　refugees，　the　government　was　hindering　the　enlargement　of
Armenian　agriculture．　In　order　to　prevent　Armenian　land　ownership，
the　Porte　erlcouraged　Muslim　high　officers　to　buy　lands　in（⊇ukurova，
During　the　AbdUlhamid　II　era，　it　was　urged　that　the　governors　and　the
commanders　purchase　lands　at　their　own　cost．　In　order　to　take　the　lead，
the　Sultan　himself，　bought　300ρ00　d6nUms　of　land．（Klray，1998：12）As
those　figures　were　hardly　interested　in　agriculture，　a　huge　quantity　of
land　was　left　unused．　The　sarne　was　true　of　state　owned　lands．　While
the　private　lands　were　generally　under　plow，　most　of　the　national　lands
were　left　uncultivated．　According　to　one　estimate，　the　latter　exceeded
the　former　by　a　five　to　one　ratio．（Bayraktar，2007：410）In　light　of　this
situation，　the　Armenians　convinced　themselves　of　the　existence　of　an
anti－Armenian　land　policy　by　the　Ottoman　government．　Mouchegh
himself　claimed　the　Neccarl1　problem　had　been　a　part　and　parcel　of　the
anti・Armenian　policy　of　the　Hamidian　regime　to　dispossess　them．　He
made　the　following　allegation．“Albeit　there　were　plenty　of　vacant　larld
for　the　settlement　of　refugees　in　the　Osmaniye　and　Hamidiye　districts，
an　Armenian　village，　Neccarl1，　was　singled　out　and　the　title　deeds　of　the
Armenians　were　to　be　annulled．　There　is　no　room　to　suspect　the　evil
intention　behind　this　policy．”（BOA，　DH．　MKT．1303／39）
Repeated　Dispute　over　the　Taylan　Ciftligi
　　　　The　restrictive　policy　of　Armenian　land　ownership　provoked　an－
other　tension　betweell　Armenians　and　Muslims．　Capitalizing　on　the
negative　attitude　of　local　authorities　to　Armenians，　Muslim　landowllers
often　violated　Armenian　possessions．　The　Armenian　owners　were　gen－
erally　vulnerable　to　the　arbitration　of　the　Muslim“Agas”as　the　latter
dominated　the　local　courts．　Muslim　notables　and　their　cronies　were
collectively　taking　actions　to　prevent　the　reparation　of　Armenian　land．
The　violation　of　the　Armenian　farms　by　nomadic　elements　was　also
、taking　Place　frequently．
　　　　The　situation　led　to　the　growing　discontent　of　Armenians．　Their
feelings　of　oppression　occasionally　took　the　form　of　open　complaint
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especially　when　their　religious　foundations　were　threatened．　The　re－
peated　violation　of　the　monastery　fund　of　Taylan（⊇iftligi　was　one　of　the
central　concerns　of　the　Armenian　commullity　in　the　Adana　province．
　　　The　monastery　belonging　to　the　Sis　Catholicate　possessed　a　farm－
1and　called　Taylan　Ciftligi．　The　origin　of　this　foundation　was　old　and
the　ownership　and　the　boundary　of　the　farm　had　been　sanctioned　by
Kozanzade　Mehmed　Bey　as　early　as　1841．　According　to　the　regulation，
the　farm　spread　across　10，000　d6nUms　of　land　although　half　of　it　was　not
cultivated　because　of　the　marshy　conditions．　The　rest　of　the　land　was
utilized　for　the　supply　of　provisions　for　the　monks　of　the　monastery．
After　the　date，　the　land　was　subjected　to　repeated　disputes．　In　February
1851，the　Catholicos　appealed　to　the　provincial　authorities　for　indemnity
for　the　violation　of　land　rights　and　the　governor　reconfirmed　the　owner－
ship　of　the　monastery，　Roughly　ten　years　later，　the　farm　was　seized
again　by　nomadic　tribes．　Upon　the　protest　of　the　Catholicate，　the　gover－
nor　of　Adana　issued　a　mandate　and　ordered　to　prevent　further　intru－
sion．　But　another　dispute　arose　in　1883，　The　acting　Catholicos　appealed
to　the　local　court　of　Kozan　and　the　court　issued　a　sentence　confirming
the　ownership　of　the　Inonastery　on　16　June　1883．（BOA，　A．　MKT．　MHM
529／22）
　　　Apart　of　the　reason　for　the　frequency　of　disputes　derived　from　the
way　that　the　Iand　was　registered　in　the　name　of　incunlbent　Catholicos．
Owing　to　this　procedure，　the　farm　was　often　confused　with　the　personal
property　of　Catholicos　and　subjected　to　the　cohfiscation　when　tehy
died．　Therefore，　a　renewed　dispute　arose　in　1906．
　　　Faced　with　the　rapid　increase　in　number　of　refugees　from　the　Bal－
kans，　the　special　committee　for　refugees　decided　to　settle　immigrants　in
Taylan　Ciftligi　this　year．（Bayraktar，2007：411）With　this　decision，　the
local　authorities　announced　the　confiscation　of　the　farm　of　the　Arme－
nian　monastery　on　the　grounds　that　the　registered　owner，　the　former
Catholicos　of　Sis，　had　long　since　died　and　that　the　land　was　vacant　frorn
alegal　point　of　view．（BOA，1，　HUS．142／1324　R－79）The　Catholicos　of　Sis
became　upset　by　the　decision　and　reiterated　the　claim　that　the　land　was
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　tareligious　possession　of　his　monastery　and　had　been　cultivated　for　the
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monk’s　provisions．　As　the　local　authorities　didn’t　concede　to　the　appeal，
he　sent　a　petition　directly　to　the　Suitan　and　requested　the　land　should
be　excluded　from　the　plan　to　colonize．（BOA，　A．　MKT．　MHM　529／22）
The　plea　was　subsequently　heard　and　the　ownership　of　the　Catholicate
was　recognized　but　with　the　condition　that　no　Armenians　would　be
settled　there　and　that　the　land　would　be　utilized　exclusively　for　agricul－
ture．（BOA，1．　HUS．142／1324　R－79）
New　Demographic　Pressure　after　the　Young　Turk　Revolution
　　　After　the　constitutional　restoration，　a　lot　of　Armenians　began　to
immigrate　into　the　Adana　province．　Some　of　them　were　those　who　had
fled　from　the　province　for　pQlitical　reasons，　others　were　those　who　were
attracted　by　the　better　working　conditions　of　this　fertile　plain．　Both　of
them　expected　a　change　of　policy　that　had　been　unfavorable　to　their
enterprises．　But　the　local　authorities　were　not　well　prepared　to　cope
with　this　new　situation　and　were　simply　perplexed　by　the　sudden　influx
of　Armenians．　Hence，　the　governor　of　Adana，　Cevad　Bey，　reported　that，
within　five　or　six　months，　a　lot　of　families　came　in　such　an　extent　that
it　was　not　rare　to　see　several　families　Iiving　together　in　the　same　build－
ing．（Abdurrahman＄eref，1996：80）
　　　Another　reason　for　this　abrupt　increase　in　the　newcomers　was　the
serious　crop　failure　that　had　plagued　the　mountainous　regions　in　Ana－
tolia．　There　were　two　consecutive　years　of　bad　harvests　in　l907　and
1908．The　winter　of　1907　was　extraordinarily　long　and　severe　and　the
snow　lay　deep　on　the　ground　until　late　in　the　spring．　As　a　result，　an
epidemic　struck　the　cattle　and　a　huge　rlumber　of　livestock，　up　to　50　per
cent　of　them，　died．　This　caused　serious　destitution　to　the　people　living
on　the　mountainside．　Owing　to　bad　dietary　conditions，　the　people　fell
victim　tQ　disease．（Ramsay，1909：280）The　next　year，　the　situation
turned　out　to　be　worse．　The　climate　was　even　more　unfavorable　for
agricultural　production　and　many　people　began　to　starve．　A　British
citizen，　who　happened　to　be　in　Istanbul　at　that　time，　described　the　pre－
dicament　as　follows：“Throughout　the　winter　of　1908　and　the　spring　of
1909Constantinople　shuddered　over　the　accounts　of　distress　which
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reached　from　the　Asiatic　vilayets，　From　Erzurum　came　heart－rending
appeals　for　the　rescue　of　the　thousands　that　perished　for　want　of　food，
clothing，　and　fue1．　Similar　appeals　poured　in　from　Caesarea　and　Bursa，
describillg　how　men，　woInen，　and　especially　children，　were　either　dying
or　were　reduced　to　skeletons．　In　the　region　of　Mardin，　twenty　thousand
villagers　were　at　the　point　of　starvation．　The　visitation　was　due　partly
tQ　the　failure　of　the　crops，　partly　to　the　severity　of　the　w宝nter，　partly　to
the　absence　of　any　reserve　either　in　kind　or　in　cash，　and　partly　to　the
depredations　already　described．”（Abbot，1909：182）
　　　The　situation　in　the　mountainous　regions　of　the　Adana　province
was　no　better　than　the　Anatolian　illterior．　An　American　missionary
reported　the　plight　of　the　peasants：“The　harvest　was　great　failure．　Irl
many　places　they　did　not　reap　1／50f　the　amount　of　seed　sown．　Conse－
quently　not　only　is　there　great　scarcity　of　wheat　for　seed　and　flour．　It
is　also　very　dear．　The　price　has　come　up　to　nearly　double　the　price　of
afew　years　ago，　at　least　l　Y20f　last　year’s　price，　There　are　many　people
who　have　no　wheat　and　no　money　with　which　to　buy．”（ABCFM，　Mis－
sionary　Report　Dec．201907）The　condition　was　especially　bad　in　the
Kozan　district．　As　a　result，　many　people　descended　into　the　plain　in　the
hope　of　finding　food　or　work．　The　same　author　warned　of　the　serious
situation：“Whole　families　are　coming．　They　have　nothing　to　bring　with
theln．”（ABCFM，　Mi∬ionary　Report　Z）ec．20　190　7）
　　　The　famine　struck　people　regardless　of　their　religion．　But　the
human　society　showed　different　attitude　to　the　victims．　The　Christians
were　treated　relatively　better　than　the　Muslims．　Western　Christian
missionaries　did　everything　to　alleviate　their　privations，　and　the　Arme－
nian　landowners　provided　them　with　work　and　shelter．（Abbot，1909：
182）In　the　case　of　Adana　province，　the　Armenian　Church　took　the　lead
ln　mitigating　the　misery　of　the　poverty－stricken　migrants　and　tried　to
find　places　to　accommodate　them．　They　distributed　lands　owned　by　the
monasteries　to　the　refugees　and　asked　permission　to　purchase　vacant
public　lands　for　their　accommodation．　Bishop　Mouchegh　was　especially
active　on　this　issue，　At　first，　he　tried　to　settle　them　in　the　vacant　land
near　Kozan　and　Cukurova　Ciftligi．　When　it　turned　out　to　be　impossible，
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he　raised　a　charity　to　purchase　lands　and　planned　to　make　trip　to　Egypt
for　this　purpose．（Abdurrahman＄eref，1996：80）
　　　On　the　other　hand，　the　Ottoman　Government　was　slow　to　act．　The
authorities　didn’t　take　the　situation　seriously，　and　couldn’t　even　under－
stand　the　reason　for　the　sudden　increase　in　the　influx　of　population．
Cevad　Bey　took　it　for　granted　that　the　influx　was　nothing　but　an　earlier
arrival　of　seasonal　workers：“50，0000r　60，000　seasonal　workers　would
come　to　Adana　from　the　other　provinces　every　year．　This　year，　the
number　of　workers　of　various　ethnicities　had　reached　15，000　by　Febru－
ary．　It　continued　to　grow　day　by　day．”（Abdurrahman＄eref，1996；81）
The　same　was　true　for　the　Muslim　citizens　in　Adana．　They　were　simply
puzzled　at　the　sudden　growth　of　the　Armenian　population　and　were　a
suspicious　glance　with　the　relief　work　initiated　by　the　Armenian
Church．　Hence，　Damar　Arikoglu　wrote　in　his　memoire：“After　the　revo－
lution，　many　Armenians　whose　origins　were　unknown　began　to　settle　in
Adana　with　their　families．　Bishop　Mouchegh　very　zealously　engaged
himself　with　their　settlement，　As　he　showed　no　sign　of　restraint，　Turks
began　to　suspect　his　intentions．”（Arlkoglu，1961：45）
Dispute　over　the　Armenian　Land　Ownership　after　the　Revolution
The　arrival　of　many　Armenians　created　another　tension　in　the　province．
The　Armenians　expected　that　the　promise　of　civil　rights　in　the　constitu－
tion　would　protect　their　property　and　demanded　that　their　stolen　prop－
erties　be　restored．　Hence，　many　Armenians　began　to　sue　for　the　return
of　their　lands　on　the　grounds　that　were　usurped　by　reactionaries　during
the　ancient　regime．　It　sparked　a　slew’of　additional　land　ownership　dis－
putes　that　raised　inter－communal　tensions．　The　Muslims　notables　were
especia11y　alarmed　by　this　development　and　they　tried　to　find　help
through　local　authorities．（Kalligian，2003：77；Irtem，2003：158）
　　　As　the　prQvincial　government　had　its　own　concern　about　the　in－
crease　of　the　Armenian　population，　it　began　to　feel　uneasy　about　the
claims　for　the　land　ownership　by　the　Armenians．　Urged　by　local　Mus・
lim　notables，　some　of　the　officers　dared　to　take　preventive　measures　and
Mehmed　Asaf，　the　iieutenant　governor　of　the　Cebel－i　Bereket，　took　the
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1ead．
　　　As　a　newly　appointed　chief　officer　of　the　Cebel－i　Bereket　prefecture，
Asaf　arrived　at　Erzin　irl　the　middle　of　September　1908．　He　soon　noticed
the　new　demographic　process　that　was　underway　in　his　prefecture．
After　the　Revolution，　a　number　of　Armenians　had　come　down　from　the
mountainous　regions　and　began　to　gather　in　three　Armerlian　villages：
D6rtyo1，0cakl1，　and　Cayli．　While　many　of　thern　were　seasonal　workers，
some　seemed　to　want　settle　there　permanently　and　began　cultivating
new　lands．　They　also　began　to　purchase　vacant　lands　or　to　work　at　the
lumber　factory　owned　by　a　British　consul　of　Alexandretta，　Catoni．　This
development　alarmed　Asaf．　He　first　nullified　permission　to　exploit　the
forest　that　had　been　given　to　Catoni　by　the　former　governor　Selim
Melhame　Pa§a　on　the　pretext　that‘‘it　was　procured　by　bribery．”（Asaf，
1986：10，37）
　　　After　cancelling　the　title　deeds　of　the　British　consul　in　an　assertive
manner，　Asaf　took　a　series　of　measures　to　curb　Armenian　land－
ownership．　This　method　was　quite　controversia1．　For　example，　in　his
memoire，　he　wrote．“The　late　Abdin　Pa＄a　registered　about　several　hun－
dreds　thousands　of　d6nUms　of　state・owned　lands　as　he　and　his　son’s
possession，　when　he　was　governor，　According　to　the　regulation，　the
government　could　confiscate　those　lands　that　had　been　left　unculti－
vated　for　more　than　three　years．　Upon　this　regulatior1，　we　confiscated
as　much　as　500，000　d6nUms　of　lands，　and　turned　them　into　public　pos－
sessiQns．”This　action，　seemingly，　was　a　routine　administrative　proce－
dure，　but　quite　mysteriously，　he　added　the　following　sentence．“Con－
cerning　this　case，　we　were　exposed　to　a　serious　scandal　which　provoked
enmity．　These　problems　later　accumulated　like　an　avalanche，　and　fell
upon　us　like　a　bolt　out　of　the　blue．”（Asaf，1986：13）
　　　This“serious　scandal”coincides　with　the　following　everlt　which
Asaf　explained　as　follows：“The　Christians　living　in　the　vicinity　of　the
barracks　in　D6rtyol　brought　in　about　five　hundreds　of　women　and　chi1－
dren，　and　occupied　as　much　as　1，000　d6r1Ums　of　empty　land　belonging　to
the　government．　They　divided　them　into　several　pieces　and　began　to
dig　ditches　around　them．　The　prefectural　government　tried　to　prevent
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this　occupation，　but　the　delegation　sent　1）r（）t〔～sting　letters　and　petitions　to
the　provincial　authorities．（ltalic　is　added）”（Asaf，1986：66）
　　　According　to　this　explanation，　Armenians　illegally　occupied　state
property．　If　so，　it　is　illogical　that　they‘‘sent　protesting　letters　and　peti－
tions　to　the　provincial　authorities．”Apart　of　the　answer　can　be　found
in　the　other　part　of　his　memoire　where　he　describes　the　same　event　in
adifferent　tone：“The　Armenians　tried　to　lay　their　hands　on　the　vacant
lands　in　the　vicinity　that　the　government　had　been　forced　to　sell．　When
they　were　denied　access　to　these　lands，　they　went　to　the　area，　and　or－
ganized　a　demonstration，　gathering　as　many　as　500　women　and　chil－
dren．　They　even　defied　authorities　and　the　law　and　order　by　illegally
building　homes　without　a　permit．（ltalic　is　added）”（Asaf，1986：35）This
testifies　that　the　government　had　already　sold　the　lands　in　question　to
Armenian　owners．
　　　Asaf　gave　more　detailed　information　on　this　case　in　his　report　to
the　governor，　Cevad　Bey，　on　2　February　l909．　This　report　helps　us　to
understand　that　the　so－called‘‘illegal　occupation　of　national　property”
was　nothing　but　a　result　of　authoritarian　interference　by　Asaf　into　an
approved　plall　for　the　residential　quarter　of　D6rtyol．　According　to　this
report，　the　disputed　lands　had　been　used　as　pastures．　So，　from　a　judicial
point　of　view，　they　would　be　considered　to　be　uncultivated　public　lands．
But　a　significant　part　of　the　lands　had　been　sold　to　Armenian　owners
several　years　before．3　As　the　new　owners　could　not　cultivate　all　the
land，　a　significant　amount　of　purchased　lands，　together　with　the　rest　of
vacant　lands，　remained　as　pasture　land．　Therefore，　the　villagers　of
D6rtyol　petitioned　that　the　lands　should　be　turned　into　a　new　residence
quarter　on　the　ground　that　the　present　state　was　improper　and　that　the
village　had　already　been　overpopulated．　The　village　priest　supported
the　plan　and　testified　that　the　lands　in　question　were　pastures　and　that
the　owners　had　agreed　to　give　up　their　right　for　the　sake　of　new　residen－
tial　plots．　As　the　local　authorities　confirmed　the　Armenian　claims，　the
proposal　was　subsequently　approved．　A　land　survey　was　carried　out
and，　upon　the　newly　drawn－up　map，　avenues　and　public　squares　were
laid　out．　The　rest　of　the　lands　were　divided　into　residential　plots　and
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distributed　by　auction．　When　villagers　were　about　to　construct　new
houses，　Asaf　intervened　with　the　process．　He　cancelled　permission　on
the　pretext　that　the　procedure　had　not　been　carried　out　with　due　proc－
ess．（TTKA，　EA　70／3）In　light　of　this　context，　it　was　natural　that　the
Armenian　villagers　considered　the　action　as　a　dereliction　with　evil　in－
tention．　Therefore，　they　staged　protests．
　　　When　the　protests　broke　out，　Asaf　reacted　even　more　aggressively．
He　not　only　sent　gendarmerie　to　stop　the　construction，　but　he　slandered
the　Armenians　of　D6rtyol　as　if　they　had　been　perpetrators　of　the　crime．
In　his　report　to　the　governor　on　26　January　1909，　Asaf　claimed：“The
population　of　a　Christian　village　as　known　as　Cokmerzemin　has　been
intruding　into　every　kind　of　public　land　since　the　declaration　of　the
constitution．　They　have　seized　lands　with　various　measures，　from　em－
bezzlement　to　intimidation　which　forced　the　government　to　sell　the
lands　in　an　auction．　When　they　were　prevented　froln　occupying　the
public　lands　once　or　twice，　they　mobilized　nearly　500　women　and　chil－
dren　to　stage　a　demonstration，　and　forcefully　construct　buildings　and
plant　crops．　In　the　light　of　this　event，　we　can’t　help　suspecting　their　evil
intentions（Italic　is　added）．”（TTKA，　EA　69／57）But　if　we　take　into　ac－
count　the　real　nature　of　the　event　described　above，　it　was　Asaf，　not　the
Armenians，　that　had　the“evil　intentions．”Asaf’s　allegation　of　an　Arme－
nian　attack　on　the　public　property　was　groundless　and　apparently　ir－
relevant．　The　Armenian　villagers　of　D6rtyol　didn’t　start　obtaining　land
until　after　the　revolution，　but　they　had　long　since　purchased　them　as
lawful　acts．　They　asked　for　permission　and　their　application　was　subse－
quently　endorsed　by　the　authorities．　Moreover，　Asaf　revealed　his　real
lntention　by　admitting　that　he　was　preventing　the　Armenians　from　ob－
taining　real　estate．　Albeit　he　pretended　to　have　foUowed　due　process　by
mentioning　the　legal　default　in　his　report　of　2　February，　his　real　inten－
tion　was　to　restrict　the　expansion　of　the　Armenian　village　at　all　costs．
The　reason　is　obvious．　Asaf　was　obsessed　by　old　prejudices　against　the
Armenians　and　clung　to　an　old　policy　to　dispossess　them．
　　　This　was　not　the　only　case　of　Asaf’s　misconduct　against　the　Arme－
nians．　He　frequently　abused　his　power　against　the　Armenians　and　the
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action　naturally　caused　an　increase　in　communal　tensions．　The　most
serious　case　was　the　confiscation　of　the　property　of　the　Mariakop　mon－
astery．　Asaf　explained　it　as　follows：“Before　the　incident，　I　filed　a　law－
suit　against　the　arable　land　that　had　been　in　the　possession　of　the
Catholicos　of　Sis，　and　turned　huge　amounts　of　olive　orchards　and　other
lands　into　public　properties．　Then，　I　took　up　the　work　to　settle　the　refu－
gees　there．　The　Armenians　organized　big　meetings　both　in　the　province
and　in　Istanbul．”（Asaf，1986：63）According　to　SUIeyman　Kani　lrtem，　the
story　was　somewhat　different：“There　was　an　olive　orchard　that　the　Sis
Catholicos　had　claimed　to　be　their　property．　The　governor　of　Cebe1－i
Bereket，　Asaf　Bey，　confiscated　it　on　the　pretext　that　it　had　turned　out　to
be　a　national　property．　The　event　caused　their　subsequent　estrange－
ment．”（Irtem，2003：165）The　explanation　of　Irtem　seems　to　be　more　ac・
curate　as　it　coincides　with　the　following　plea　of　Bishop　Mouchegh．
“There　was　another　dispute　over　lands　in　the　Payas　region．　The　plot
was　composed　of　two　thousand　d6nUms　of　olive　orchards．　The　owner－
ship　of　the　land　by　the　Sis　monastery　had　been　ascertained　by　the　deci－
sion　of　local　court　in　1883／1884．　But　the　local　government　tried　to
confiscate　it　on　the　pretext　that　it　was　a　public　property．”（BOA，　DH．
MKT．1303／39）
　　　These　actions　of　Asaf　naturally　caused　an　allgry　reaction　on　the
Armenian　side．　As　they　still　had　vivid　melnories　of　the　dispute　over
Taylan　Ciftligi，　a　forceful　confiscation　of　religious　property　which　pro・
voked　great　indignation　by　the　Armenian　Church．　The　Catholicos　of
Sis　resigned　in　protest　against　the　court　decision　on　17　February　1909．
Three　days　later，　the　deputy　Catholicos　sent　telegrams　to　Adana，
Aylntab，　Maras，　Zeytun，　Yozgad，　Diyarbakir　and　Malatya　and　in－
structed　the　people　to　organize　protest　meetings．　With　this　appea1，　the
Armenian　schools　went　on　strike．　The　protest　grew　massively　and
Ineetings　were　held　in　Istanbul，　Aymtab，　Mara＄，　Yozgad，　and　Malatya．
In　this　way，　the　protest　began　to　take　on　the　form　of　an　Armenian　na・
tional　movement．（BOA，　DH．　MKT．2745／71）
　　　The　event　further　deteriorated　inter－communal　relations　in　many
places　in　the　Adana　province．　The　situation　of　HaCin　became　especially
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serious．　The　excitement　brought　Muslim　and　Christian　communities　to
the　brink　of　confrontation．　Many　people　appeared　in　the　streets　and
gathered　at　various　corners　in　small　groups　of　five　or　ten．　Some　were
evell　using　arms　for　target　practice．　As　a　result，　it　was　rumored　among
Muslims　that　the　Christians　had　completed　military　preparation　to　em－
bark　on　a　massacre．　Alarmed　by　the　situation，　the　lieutenant　governor
of　Kozan　set　out　for　Hagin　to　appease　the　population　and　Cevad　Bey
asked　the　Interior　Minister　to　review　the　suit　over　the　property　in　ques－
tiol1．　The　situation　caused　anxiety　in　the　central　government　and　the
Interior　Ministry　ordered　the　governors　of　Aleppo，　Ankara，　Sivas　and
MamuretUlaziz　to　take　necessary　measures　to　stabihze　the　situation．
（BOA，　DH．　MKT．2745／71）
The　Repercussions　of　the　Land　Dispute　over　Armeno－Muslim　Rela－
tions
　　　Asaf’s　policy　duly　collided　with　the　policy　of　Bishop　Mouchegh，
who　was　eager　to　accommodate　the　Armenian　settlers．　Urged　by　the
diocesans　who．had　suffered　harassment　by　the　nomadic　tribes，
Mouchegh　embarked　on　an　investigation　in　Cebel－i　Bereket　during　the
winter　of　1908－09．　He　stayed　there　for　about　one　month　and　visited　all
the　Armenian　villages　in　the　prefecture．（Seropean，1909：21）
　　　In　the　course　of　the　investigation，　he　came　to　realize　that，　after　the
Revolution，　the　control　over　local　politics　by　the“Agas”（local　bosses）
became　even　more　oppressive　than　before．　Some　of　them　intentionally
deprived　people　of　their　cattle　as　if　they　had　openly　defied　the　new
regime．　Urged　by　their　misconduct，　th6　activities　of　unruly　Kurdish
tribes　revived　and　extortions　to　the　settled　peasants　were　frequently
taking　place．　As　we　can　see　in　the　following　quote，　Mouchegh　strongly
condemned　the　arbitrary　actions　of　the“Agas”and　appealed　to　the　gov－
ernor：“The　local　bosses　treat　the　district　inhabitants　as　if　they　were
their　possessions　and　divide　them　among　themselves．　They　behave　as
if　they　are　heads　of　a　band　of　brigands＿　They　dislike　Christians　so
completely　that　they　never　let　them　possess　properties　in　the　district．”
（BOA，　DH．　MKT．1303／39）
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　　　What　was　more　serious，　however，　was　the　fact　that　the　local　officers
didn’t　take　any　effective　measures　to　curb　the　transgressions．
（Seropian，1909：72－75）Mouchegh　became　especially　irritated　by　their
negative　attitudes　to　Armenian　claims　of　landownership，　During　those
days，　many　Armenians　filed　lawsuits　re－claiming　the　properties　that
had　allegedly　been　grabbed　by　the“Agas．”But　the　court　decisions　usu－
ally　turned　out　to　be　favorable　to　the“Agas．”Although　a　part　of　the
reason　must　have　been　found　in　the　fact　that　the　local　courts　were
dominated　by　allies　or　henchlnen　of　the“Agas，”Mouchegh　put　the
blame　on　the　officers　and　condemned　them　for　having　abetted　the
“Agas．”For　example，　he　strongly　denounced　the　behavior　of　the　magis－
trate　of　Osmaniye：
“The　effect　of　the　constitution　and　freedom　that　had　brought　about　great
innovation　all　over　Turkey　is　still　not　felt　in　the　Osmaniye　district．　The
reason　for　the　continuation　of　this　reactionary　regime　is，　first　of　all，　the
action　of　the　local　officers　and，　secondary，　the　existence　of　local　bosses．　The
district　head　is　an　incapable　and　rude　petson．　He　doesn’t　allow　the　popula－
tion　to　benefit　from　freedom　and　the　constitution．　He　didn’t　take　up　the
petitions　of　Armeniarls　who　had　come　to　ask　for　help　in　defending　their
rights　and　seriously　insulted　them．　He　is　no　more　than　a　tool　of　the　local
bosses　and　is　simply　carrying　out　their　desires．”（BOA，　DH．　MKT．1303／39）
　　　If　we　take　into　consideration　the　above　mentioned　policy　of　Asaf，
these　allegations　were　not　altogether　without　justification．　It　was　also
reported　that　the　Armenian　request　for　empty　land　in　the　Payas　district
had　been　rejected　on　the　pretext　that　it　was　earmarked　for　Muslim　refu－
gees．　The　magistrate　of　Osmaniye　even　purchased　an　estate　himself　at
amuch　cheaper　price　than　an　Armenian　bidder，　saying　that“the　Arme・
nians　had　no　right　to　the　property　there．”（Tasvir一i　Efkαr，13　July　1909）
　　　Mouchegh　worked　uncompromisingly　to　publicize　the　Armenian
request　heard　at　the　local　authorities　and　was　not　even　afraid　of　an
open　confrontation　with　the　officers　in　charge，　He　made　an　official
protest　against　the　dereliction　when　he　visited　magistrate　offices　and
threatened　them　with　a　possible　dismissal　of　the　case　if　they　didn’t　yield
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to　his　demands．　It　only　stiffened　the　resolve　of　the　officers　and　made
them　more　hostile　to　the　Armenians．　Mouchegh　became　especially　of－
fended　by　the　attitude　of　Mehmed　Asaf　and　wrote　in　his　memoire：“ln
the　course　of　this　trip，　we　had　the　opportunity　to　meet　the　Governor　of
Cebel－i　Bereket　and　to　watch　very　closely　his　way　of　behavior　that　was
not　at　all　within　the　bounds　of　the　constitution．”（Seropian，1909：21）
With　the　conviction　that　the　hostile　policy　against　Armenians　had　been
carried　out　by　his　instruction，　Mouchegh　filed　a　petition　to　the　governor
Cevad　Bey　and　requested　the　dismissal　of　Asaf　and　his　subordinates　on
23January　1909．（BOA，　DH．　MKT．1303／39）
　　　The　Mouchegh’s　trip　to　the　Cebel－i　Bereket　constituted　one　of　the
most　important　causes　of　the　bloody　incidents　that　were　to　break　out
during　the　April　in　1909．　The　event　created　a　drastic　change　in　the
attitude　of　both　the　Armenian　population　and　the　Muslim　bureaucrats．
Mouchegh　himself　admitted　in　his　memoire　that　the　experience　in　the
prefecture　led　him　to　the　following　conviction：“Having　completed　our
investigation，　we　became　corlvinced　that，　under　the　leadership　of　the
notables　and　Muslinl　religious．figures，　a　vicious　conspiracy　was　under－
way　amongst　the　Turkish　population　against　the　Constitution　and　its
supporters．　The　conspiracy　was　targeting　the　Armenians　as　the　first
victims．　Therefore，　we　thought　it　our　duty　to　urge　our　flock　to　arm
themselves　as　much　as　they　could．”（Seropian，1909：21）This　statement
ls　apParently　illogical　as　it　relates　the　conservative　land　policy　to　a
prelude　to　the　Armenian　massacre；however，　deep　distrust　and　personal
hostility　to　Asaf，　coupled　with　the　aggressive　attitude　of　the　latter，　led
Mouchegh　to　believe　in　a　conspiracy．　With　this　ungrounded　conviction，
he　encouraged　the　Armenian　parishioners　to　arm　themselves　and　en－
couraged　a　tax　boycott．4　These　instigations，　in　turn，　gave　additional
grounds　in　Asaf’s　belief　that　the　Armenians　were　preparing　for　an　arm－
ed　uprising．
　　　So　far，　the　governor　of　Adana，　Cevad　Bey，　had　distanced　himself
from　the　overt　anti・Armenian　policy　pursued　by　Asaf．5　But　the　growing
tension　between　the　two　communities　gradually　affected　Cevad’s　view
on　the　question6，　and　finally，　the　governor　decided　to　side　with　Asaf，　as
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the　situation　mushroomed　into　an　air　of　Armeno－Muslim　confrontation．
It　is　most　probable　that　the　dispute　over　religious　property　and　the
roundtrip　of　Mouchegh　constituted　an　important　turning　point．
Mouchegh’s　request　to　remove　Asaf　and　his　subordinates　and　the　threat
to　publicize　the　petition　in　case　Cevad　should　not　yield　to　the　demand
might　be　a　part　of　the　reasons　for　this　deterioration　in　relations．　But　the
incitement．Qf　tax　boycott　and　the　dispute　over　the　monastery’s　or－
chards　seems　to　be　fatal，　as　Cevad　created　the　conditions　which　led　to
the　expulsion　of　Mouchegh　in　his　report　to　the　interior　ministry　dating
from　31　January　1909：“We　must　pay　attention　to　the　following　facts．
The　above－mentioned　prelate　went　around　the　Armenian　quarters　and
inspired　them　not　to　pay　taxes　and　military　exemption　fees．　He　should
be　held　responsibility　for　this．　Moreover，　he　has　openly　intervened　into
the　dispute　concerning　the　olive　groves　of　Tlrlncall　and　Lece，　which　he
claimed　to　be　the　property　of　a　monastery　under　the　jurisdiction　of　the
Sis　Catholicos．　By　doing　so　he　exceeded　his　competence　and　intruded
into　the　duty　of　Catholicate．鱒（Tasvir・i　Efhar，13　July　1909）
　　　This　statement　confirms　that　Mouchegh　was　dismissed　because　he
had　intervened　into　the　land　dispute，　not　because　he　had　staged　intrigue
as　was　alleged　by　Asaf．　Therefore，　the　dismissal　of　Mouchegh　was　no
help　in　arneliorating　the　situation．　As　the　principal　source　of　the　unrest
was　the　dispute　over　Armenian　land　ownership，　it　couldn’t　be　solved　by
the　dismissal　of　a　Bishop．　On　the　contrary，　his　expulsion　caused　further
confusion．　The　reason　was　obvious．　Mouchegh　had　been　hitherto　fullc－
tioning　as　the　emblematic　figure　of　the　Armenian　interest　in　the　land
dispute，7　so　his　dismissal　caused　great　disappointment　among　the　Arme－
nians．　It　was　no　coincidence　that　the　principal　request　of　Mouchegh’s
petltion　contained　the　followillg　two　basic　demands　on　the　land　owner－
ship：1）“To　set　up　a　committee　to　investigate　the　lands　that　had　been
usurped　by　the　tyrants，　to　commit　the　usurpers　to　the　prosecutors，　and
to　return　the　violated　properties　to　the　owrlers　without　delay，”2）“As
there　is　a　plenty　of　vacant　land　in　the　province，　it　is　necessary　to　distrib・
ute　plots　to　the　landless　peasants　and　nomadic　people　and　let　them　en－
gage　in　agriculture．”（BOA，　DH．　MKT．1303／39）Both　of　th6　two　requests
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were　of　general　concerll　to　the　Armenians　in　the　Adana　province．
Therefore，　his　dismissal　was　seen　by　the　Armenians　as　an　official　rejec－
tion　to　their　demands．
　　　The　claim　was　reiterated　when　the　land　question　became　the　main
agenda　of　the　provincial　assembly　held　in　March　1909．　During　this
meeting，　an　Armenian　representative　from　the　Kozan　district　proposed
that，　that　since　Hagin　was　located　on　a　hilly　site　and　its　lacking　in　arable
land，　it　was　preventing　the　poor　population　from　producing　more，　and
the　government　should　settle　five　hundred　households　into　other　places
in　Kozan，　other　farmlands　in　Cukurova，　or　other　locations　specified　by
the　authorities．　As　the　proposal　aimed　to　promote　the　local　economy，
the　other　Christian　delegates　supPorted　the　idea．　But　the　governor，
Cevad　Bey，　opposed　it　on　the　grounds　that　there　were　nomadic　tribes
which　needed　to　be　settled　in　the　province，　and　that，　if　this　measure　was
introduced，　other　members　of　the　population　would　claim　the　same
treatment．　Instead，　the　governor　suggested　that　needy　Armenians
should　find　their　living　in　trade　and　in　crafts．　This　contention　appar－
ently　stemmed　from　an　old　policy　consolidated　during　the　Hamidian　era
that　had　restricted　the　enlargement　of　Armenian　farms　and　promoted
the　Muslim　population　in　the　countryside．　The．　policy　was　also　favor－
able　to　the　Muslim　landowners　as　they　could　avoid　the　competition
with　Armenian　producers．　As　a　result，　the　Muslim　delegates　who　con－
stituted．　the　majority　of　the　assembly　sided　with　Cevad　and　the　plan
was　abandoned．（Abdurrahman＄eref，1996：80；K6vorkian，1999：Section
??
　　　This　decision　seriously　deteriorated　the　Armeno－Muslim　relations
that　had　already　gone　into　a　delicat．e　stage．　In　the　eyes　of　the　Armeni－
ans，　the　Muslim　delegates　and　the　provincial　government　were　carrying
out　a　concerted　obstruction　to　their　demands，　Moucheg　condemned　the
action　as　follows，“Muslim　melnbers　of　the　General　Council　of　the　prov－
lnce，　led　by　Vali，　showed　a　systematic　and　stubborn　opposition　to　all
P「Qposals　of　the　patriotic　Armenian　delegates，　and　sought　to　prevent
the　implementation　of　all　reforms，　and．、all　work　that　might　benefit　Ar－
menians　in　any　way．”（Seropian，1909：26）In　this　way，　the　Armenian
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distrust　on　the　restrictions　to　their　land　ownership　grew　into　a　total
hostility　to　the　provincial　government　and　the　Muslim　communityl　and
led　them　to　believe　that　the　situation　had　become　even　worse　than　in
the　Hamidian　period．
Conclusion
　　　The　dispute　over　Armenian　land　Qwnership　had　a　long　history　in
the　Adana　province．　As　early　as　the　beginning　of　the　1880，　the
AbdUlhamid　regime　felt　uneasy　about　the　increase　in　the　Armenian
population　and　the　spread　of　their　land　ownership．　The　government
introduced　restrictive　measures　and　tried　to　curb　the　proliferation　of
the　Armenian　possessions．　While　promoting　the　Muslim　immigration，
it　urged　Muslim　magnates　to　purchase　land　regardless　of　their　proper
utilization．　The　policy　resulted　in　the　underdeveloplnent　of　the　Muslim
sector　of　society　and　enhanced　the　disparity　between　the　two　communi・
ties．　It　also　bred　the　discontent　of　Arnlenian　farmers　who　had　been
eager　to　enlarge　their　enterprises．　The　excessive　concern　to　curb　Arme－
nian　property　provoked　communal　tensions　as　in　the　case　of　the　abor－
tive　confiscation　of　key　religious　properties．
　　　After　the　Young　Turk　Revolution，　the　situation　became　even
worse，　as　the　Armenians　expected　a　change　of　policy　and　filed　suits　to
re－claim　their　rights　which　were　allegedly　violated．　They　also　tried　to
obtain　new　lands　and　requested　the　local　government　to　sell　their　non－
utilized　properties．　The　action　alarmed　the　Muslim　local　bosses　who
had　enjoyed　a　privileged　position　during　the　Hamidian　era．　Therefore，
the　dispute　over　land　ownership　appeared　to　be　the　focal　point　of　the
tension　between　the　two　communities．
　　　What　was　crucial　in　this　context　was　the　behavior　of　the　local　offi－
cers．　A　group　of　officers　led　by　Mehmed　Asaf　apparently　sided　with　the
Musliln　landlords．　They　assisted　the　Muslim　local　bosses　to　rule　out　the
Armenian　claims　for　restitution　and　demonstrated　a　negative　predispo－
sition　to　their　petitions．　They　even　tried　to　dispossess　Armenians　in
through　illegal　and　through　questionable　practices．
　　　These　actions　led　the　Armenians　to　convince　the　local　government
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abetted　the　Muslim　reactionaries　even　after　the　Revolution　and　this
belief　eventually　consolidated　into　the　conspiracy　theory　that　the
Adana　incident　was　a　well－prepared　conspiracy　to　annihilate　the　Arme－
nians　by　the　Muslim　authorities．　But　such　an　assessment　grossly　be－
trays　the　real　picture．
　　　Firstly，　there　was　no　clear　policy　to　the　Armenian　land　ownership
on　the　side　of　the　provincial　government．　The　anti－Armenian　policy　of
conservative　bureaucrats　was　motivated　by　their　personal　dislike　of
this　minority．　The　case　of　Mehlned　Asaf　clearly　demonstrates　this
point．　He　was　apparently　obsessed　by　the　old　stereotype　of　Armenian
separatism　and　looked　at　their　community　as　politically　monolithic．
The　intervention　and　the　confiscation　of　Armenian　property　were　car－
ried　out　by　his　personal　initiative．　The　governor，　Cevad　Bey，　didn’t　give
order　in　these　matters　and　even　declined　a　part　of　his　proposals．
Equally　important　is　the　fact　that　Asaf　was　a　hostile　critic，　if　not　an
open　opponent，　to　Constitutionalism　and　the　policy　of　the　CUP．　There－
fore，　it　is　irrelevant　to　identify　Asaf’s　conduct　either　with　the　politics　of
the　new　constltutional　government　or　those　of　the　CUP．
　　　The　behavior　of　Mouchegh　Seropians　was　no　less　problematic．　But
this　is　not　because　he　staged　the　uprising，　as　was　claimed　by　Asaf　and
other　bureaucrats．　His　Ramkavars　membership　may　give　room　to　hy－
pothesize　an　Armenian　conspiracy．　But，　given　the　insignificance　of　his
party　and　the　apparent　lack　of　concerted　action　at　the　time　of　the　out－
break　of　hostilities，　this　conspiracy　theory　is　unrealistic．　The　general
course　of　his　activities　can　be　explained　in　an　alternative　way．　The
motivation　to　colonize　Armenians　in　the　Adana　plain　derived　both　from
the　urgency　that　was　created　by　the　massive　influx　of　the　homeless　and
from　the　expectation　of　a　change　in　policy　based　on　the　new　principles
of　Constitutional，“Unity　in　Variety．”The　instigation　of　a　tax　boycott
can　be　explained　as　a　form　of　protest　to　the　authoritarian　rule　of　conser－
vative　bureaucrats．　But　the　method　Mouchegh　employed　in　pursuing
his　goal　was　improper．　It　was　following　a　collision　course　with　provin－
clal　authorities．　These　measures　not　only　gave　the　conservatives　a　jus－
tification　that　the　Armenians　were　committing　anti’90ve「nment　ac”
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tions，　but　also　made　it’impossible　to　establish　a　compromise　with　the
authorities．　His　hasty　and　stubborn　tenacity　also　produced　suspicion
among　the　Muslim　population　and　exacerbated　tensions　within　the
　　　　　　　　．communlty．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Notes
l　The　Ba舘dadizades　seem　to　have　had　a　connection　with　some　CUP　members
　　long　before　the　revolution．　AbdUlkadir　KemaIi　witnesses　that　Mehmet
　　Bagdadizade，　a　son　of　AbdUlkadir，　had　had　critical　views　on　the　Abd田一
　　hamid’s　regime　and　he　was　entrusted　a　novel　by　Namuk　Kemal　and　a　work
　　of　Murat　Bey，　both　of　which　were　banned　by　the　government．（AbdUlkadir
　　Kemali，2005：29－30）
2　The　aims　and　motives　of　Armenian　armament　must　have　been　defensive．
　　The　following　episode　suggests　it．　After　the　April　incident，　the　court－
　　martial　of　MaraS　charged　the　Armenian　prelate　of　Hagin，　Dernerses　veled－i
　　Ohannes　Vanperyan　with　the　following　offenses．　He　was　a　supporter　of　the
　　separatist　moveme且t　and　declared　so　in　a　speech　given　at　a　school　in
　　Mara§．　He　also　urged　the　audience　to　arm　themselves，　and　tried　to　provoke
　　afratricide　between　Muslims　and　Armenians　by　instigating　mutual　hatred．
　　Against　these　charges，　the　priest　explained　his　intention　had　been　to　per－
　　suade　the　people　to　take　up　arms　to　defend　the　government　from　the　reac－
　　tionaries．　The　lieutenant　governor　of　Mara＄investigated　the　case，　and
　　found　that　the　assertion　of　the　accused　was　true．（BOA：MV．133／85）
3　According　to　Asaf’s　allegation，”For　unhnown　reasons，　three　or　five　villagers
　　obtained　the　title　deeds　of　a　total　of　80　d6nUms　one　or　two　years　ago．（ltalic
　　is　added）”TTK　Archive，　EA　70／3
4　According　to　Mouchegh，　the　tax　boycott　had　two　aims．　One　was　a　protest
　　tG　illegal　taxation　and　the　other　was　a　demonstration　of　a　collective　will　of
　　the　Armenians　to　be　enrolled　in　military　service．　The　latter　was　justified
　　by　the　following　rhetoricl“The　collective　approach　by　which　the　Armenian
　　population　of　the　province　showed　the　Government　their　refusal　to　pay
　　military　tax　for　fiscal　year　1909　and　their　legitimate　desire，　their　willing－
　　ness　to　do　rnilitary　service　prescribed　by　the　Constitution．”（Seropian，1909：
　　26）
5　1f　we　consider　the　fact　that　Cevad　didn’t　sanction　the　proposal　to　confiscate
　　the　Armenian　prQperty　around　Ocakl1，　notwithstanding　the　request　of　Asaf
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　　（Asaf，1986：66），we　can　conclude　that　the　decisions　to　nullify　the　Armenian
　　title　deeds　in　the　Cebel－i　Bereket　were　initiated　by　Asaf．
6　The　author　is　by　no　means　claiming　that　Cevad　was　convinced　of　the　Ar・
　　menian　conspiracy　as　early　as　February　of　l909．　He　had　been　skeptical　of
　　Asaf’s　allegation　of　how　the　incident　broke　out　on　16　April．　Until　the　mo－
　　ment　he　saw　the　opening　fire　of　the　Armenian　fedais（volunteer　soldiers），
　　he　remained　optimistic　about　the　situation．
7　Mouchegh　intentionally　identified　himself　as　such．1耳his　circular　of　7
　　November，　he　appealed　to　his　flock　as　follows：“lf　ever　you　are　the　victims
　　of　arbitrary　acts．．．　appeal　without　fear　to　the　local　authorities，　and　if　your
　　appeal　remains　fruitless＿apply　to　the　Metropolitan，　which　is　ready．．．　to
　　take　in　hand　the　defence　of　your　disregarded　rights．”（Ferriman，1913：18）
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